Computability in Europe 2008
Logic and Theory of Algorithms

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Regular Talk:
Discrete Non Determinism and Nash Equilibria for Strategy-Based Games

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Speaker: Stephane Le Roux
Slot: Mon, 11:00-11:20, Great Hall (col. 5)

Abstract

Not all strategic games have Nash equilibria, so Nash defined probabilistic
equilibria, which exist in all strategic games. However, the probability
approach fails for the slightly more general abstract strategic games that are
defined in this paper. Instead, this paper uses \emph{discrete non determinism},
which yields relevant notions of equilibrium with guaranteed existence. These
equilibria are payoff-wise \emph{efficient and easy to find}. Moreover, the
discrete approach still works for much more general games supporting both
sequential and simultaneous decision-making.

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