# CS\_313 High Integrity Systems/ CS\_M13 Critical Systems

Course Notes

Additional Material
Chapter 5: The Development Cycle for Safety-Critical Systems

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http://www.cs.swan.ac.uk/~csetzer/lectures/critsys/14/index.html

November 23, 2014

- 5 (a) Life Cycle Models
- 5 (b) The Safety Life Cycle
- 5 (c) Development Methods
- 5 (d) Designing for Safety
- 5 (e) Human Factors in Safety
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- 5 (g) Safety Management
- 5 (h) The Safety Case

### 5 (a) Life Cycle Models

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
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### Model from IEC 1508


- ► This is a model from the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).
- ► The IEC 1508 standard is a intended to be a generic basis for standards in all industrial sectors.
- ▶ It has three phases:
  - Design,
  - planning/realisation
  - installation/operation
- Standard describes in detail
  - the activities to be performed during each phase of the life cycle,
  - ▶ the expected inputs and outputs of each phase.

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# Develoment Life Cycle Part 1 (IEC 1508)



# Development Life Cycle Part 2 (IEC 1508)



## Other Life Cycle Models

- ▶ Probably more modern **iterative models** like the **spiral model** are used nowadays in safety critical systems as well.
  - ► They need some adaption since they might be as they stand too loose about requirements analysis and specification.


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# (b) The Safety Life Cycle


- ► The safety life cycle is the process of safety specification and assurance.
- ▶ The next slide describes the safety life cycle according to IEC 1508.
  - ▶ It is very similar to the life cycle model of the IEC 1508.
  - ▶ Differences are marked in *red italic*.

# Safety Life Cycle Part 1 (IEC 1508)



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# Safety Life Cycle Part 2 (IEC 1508)



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## (c) Development Methods

- ▶ Main elements of the development process of safety critical systems are similar to that of less critical units.
- ► However, the need to produce and demonstrate dependability requires that each phase is carefully structured and documented.

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### Requirements and Hazard Analysis

► Was already discussed.

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# Specification

See main slides

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## **Animation and Prototyping**

- ▶ Problem of validation of specifications.
- ► Cannot be done formally.
- ► Two approaches of tackling that problem are **software animation** and **prototyping**.
- ► **Software prototyping** means that one builds a prototype based on the specification in order to test it.
  - ▶ Problem is that the prototype is **removed from the specification**.
  - ▶ The prototype is only one example of implementing the specification.
  - ► Further, when building the prototype, one might not interpret the specification correctly.
    - Therefore the prototype might not fully fulfil the specification.

## Animation and Prototyping

- Software animation means that one directly executes or tests the specification.
  - For instance, one can check what happens if one specialises the specification to some instance, and if one executes an operation specified.
  - ► Advantage is that one works directly with the specification.
  - The disadvantage is that software animation might not be as concrete as prototyping.
    - ▶ One usually doesn't obtain a real system.

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### Animation vs. Simulation

- ► Animation/prototyping are different from **simulation**.
  - ► **Simulation** is the development of trial software based on the design of the software, in order to test it.
  - Animation is a test of the specification.
  - Simulation is a test of the design.

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## Top-Level Design

- ▶ In top-level design, the following steps are carried out:
  - Partitioning of system functions into those carried out by hardware and those carried out by software.
  - ► **Decomposition** of hardware and software architecture into manageable modules.
    - Determination of interfaces between modules.
    - Specification of functions and safety features of each module.
  - Identification of major data structures within the software.

- The detailed design precedes the actual implementation of the software.
- ► First one gathers information about the module and makes initial decisions about it form.
  - One concentrates in this period on what the module has to do rather than how this is achieved

- ► The data gathered is as follows:
  - Purpose of the module, including primary and secondary requirements.
    - ▶ Includes behaviour in exceptional situations.
  - Data use.
    - ► Input.
    - Output.
    - External data shared with other modules.
    - ▶ Internal data shared by the functions of the module.
  - Performance
    - ▶ Time and space constraints of the module.
    - Often overlooked.

#### Fault conditions

- ► Failures which might occur within the module and its interfaces.
- ► Conditions under which a failure mode can occur have to be identified.

### Integrity level

Which integrity level is to be assigned to that module.

### Testing.

 Identification of, what conditions have to be verified by testing, and what level of correctness is to be achieved.

► Once the above data has been collected, the units are decomposed into smaller and smaller modules, until modules which can be implemented directly have been identified.

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# Module Implementation and Testing

- ► Once the smallest units have been identified, they will be implemented.
- Special techniques used in implementing, e.g. defensive programming.
  - Defensive programming means that one adds extra tests, even if one assumes that they are not necessary, in order to catch programming errors as early as possible.
    - ▶ E.g. even if one assumes that an input parameter is is always  $\geq$  0, one still deals with the case that it might be < 0.
- ▶ Then modules will be tested, see Section 8.

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## System Integration

- System integration means to assemble the complete system from its component modules.
- ► Then initial testing is performed, before progressing to full system testing and validation.
- ▶ There are two main techniques for system integration:
  - ► Progressive integration.
  - ► The big bang method.

## Progressive Integration

- ► In progressive integration
  - ▶ One starts with combining a small number of modules,
    - which are then tested, and problems are removed.
  - Then additional modules are added successively,
    - which are tested, and problems are removed.
  - ▶ This is done until the complete system is assembled.
- Advantage:
  - Problems observed in testing only involve the few modules added in the last incrementation step.
    - ▶ Therefore the reasons for those problems can be more easily identified.

## Progressive Integration

### ▶ Disadvantage:

- Problems, associated with the overall system are not visible, until the complete system is assembled.
- ▶ Then it is very expensive to deal with these problems.

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# Big Bang Method

- ▶ In the **big bang method**, all modules are combined immediately, and the complete system is tested.
  - Assumption is that the design of the overall system was done carefully and that each unit was tested thoroughly.
  - ▶ Then integration shouldn't cause big problems.
- ► Advantages and disadvantages of the big bang method are the opposite of those for progressive integration.
- ▶ Big bang approach less common than progressive integration.

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## System Test and Certification

- ▶ System testing will be treated later.
- ► In the certification, the development process of the system is carefully investigated
  - Usually based on some form of standard.
  - The developer has to convince the regulators that all relevant hazards have been identified and dealt with.
  - ► The certification process does not
    - prove the correctness of the system,
    - remove any of the developer's legal or moral obligations.
  - ► However the certification process promotes the use of approved techniques and will usually lead to safer products.

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# (d) Designing for Safety

- ► We consider the design process with respect to safety of the overall system.
- ▶ There are four activities in the design process:
  - Abstraction
    - ▶ The operation of generalising and identifying the essentials.
  - ► Decomposition
    - The process of reducing an object into a number of simpler, smaller parts.
    - ▶ The analysis of interactions, interfaces and structures.
    - Modularisation.

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# Activities of the Design Proc. (Cont.)

- Elaboration
  - ► The operation of detailing, adding features.
- Decision making
  - ▶ Identification and selection of alternative strategies.

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## Softwer Partitioning, Safety Kernel

This material can be found in the main slides.

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## Support of Software Isolation

- Programming languages might or might not support isolation of modules
  - Assembler and C don't support isolation of modules all routines are allowed to write to all memory locations.
  - More modern languages like Pascal, Ada or Java support isolation of modules in a better way.

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### Isolation of Modules and Parallel.

- Isolation of modules requires as well that no module can block other modules by getting hung up.
  - ▶ By getting hung up one module with low criticality
    - e.g. a module responsible for communications in a space craft, could block another highly critical module, which operates in parallel, but is not related with the other module

## Support of Software Isolation

- ▶ Problems with parallelism can be controlled by **operating systems**, which allocate time to different **threads** and therefore make sure that the system doesn't get hung up with one thread.
  - ► **Problematic** to use operating systems, since they are usually too complex in order to be verifiable.
- ► Instead one can use **runtime kernels** with a **task scheduler**, which are much smaller than usual operating systems, and have therefore higher level of integrity.
  - ► Acceptable for systems of lower criticality.

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#### Support of Software Isolation

- ► For highest critical functions, use of runtime kernels is still not acceptable, because they are too complex.
  - ► Instead one has to program the critical functions including scheduling completely by hand.

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#### No Additional Material

For this subsection no additional material has been added yet.

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# (f) Safety Analysis

- ► Safety analysis is the process of assessing the safety of a system by looking at the associated hazards and the methods used by the system to cope with them.
  - Also called overall safety validation.
- ► The next slide gives the steps in safety analysis according to the **Health and Safety Executive (HSE)** in **UK**.

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# Steps in Safety Analysis (HSE)

- (1) Analyse the hazards.
  - (a) identify the potential hazards,
  - (b) evaluate the **events** leading to these hazards.
- (2) Identify the safety-related systems within the plant.
- (3) **Design** the safety-related system using the safety integrity criteria appropriate for the specific application.
- (4) Carry out a **safety integrity analysis** to assess the level of safety integrity achieved by the safety-related systems.
- (5) **Ensure**, from the analysis of (4), that the **integrity levels** of (3) have been **achieved**.

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# (g) Safety Management


- ► Safety management is the
  - planning,
  - ► organisation,
  - monitoring and
  - evaluation

of safety aspects of a project.

#### **Essentials of Safety Management**

- ▶ In order to achieve a high degree of safety it is important that
  - a safety culture is encouraged from the top;
  - a well-defined safety policy exists in order to establish the working practices of the organisation and to ensure that these are followed;
  - safety performance is monitored
    - both in-house and by using independent assessments of safety systems and procedures.
- ► The next slide shows the management structure recommended by Interim Defence Standard 00-55 (MoD, UK, 1991).

# Safety Man. Struct. (Int. Def. Stan.)



- Project Manager bears ultimate responsibility for development of the system and its safety.
- ► The project manager delegates much of the task of developing the system to the **project management team**.
- ► This team
  - ▶ is the design authority;
  - will at the end sign off the system on behalf of the project manager;
  - is primarily responsible for administrating the safety aspects of the project.

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- ► As part of dealing with the **safety aspects**, the project management team
  - will perform hazard and risk analysis;
  - will ensure that components are developed according to an appropriate integrity level;
  - will perform verification at each phase of the design;
  - this includes
    - preparation of a safety plan;
    - maintenance of the safety log (containing the safety activities and results of hazard analyses).

- ► The **design team** carries out the actual specification, design and implementation of the system.
- ► The independent safety assessor
  - reviews and audits all activities and documents relevant to safety.
  - provides an independent check on the activities of the project management team.
- ► The independent verification and validation team (IV&V team)
  - ▶ looks at the design at each stage;
  - provides separate check on its correctness.
  - Often, the IV&V team is from an external company, specialised in that work.

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# (h) Safety Management


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