6 (a) Introduction

6 (b) Types of Faults

6 (c) Fault Models

6 (d) Fault Coverage

6 (e) Redundancy

6 (f) Fault Detection Techniques

6 (g) Hardware Fault Tolerance

6 (h) Software Fault Tolerance

6 (i) Fault Tolerant Architectures

6 (j) Example: The Space Shuttle

For this subsection no additional material has been added yet.
Faults can be characterised by the following criteria:
- Nature (random/systematic).
- Duration.
- Extent.

Classification by Nature

Faults can be classified by their nature: random vs. systematic faults:

- **(i) Random faults.**
  - Random faults are faults in components of a system, which occur with a certain probability.
  - We can predict random faults by collecting statistical data from large numbers of samples of similar components.
  - Random faults are usually hardware faults.
    - Reason for random faults are that any hardware is subject to environmental influences, which might affect its correct operation.
    - E.g. radioactivity, radiation, humidity, warmth, cold, wear and tear.
  - In software reliability engineering one considers as well software errors as random.
  - Because random faults can be predicted well, they are more easy to tolerate.
Classification by Nature

(ii) **Systematic Faults**
- Systematic faults are faults which are not random.
  - Either a component has it, or it doesn't have it.
- Software faults are usually considered to be systematic.
- Three kinds of systematic faults:
  - Mistakes in the specification of a system.
  - Mistakes in the implementation of software.
  - Mistakes in the design of hardware.
- Difficult to tolerate.
  - E.g. if two programmers write the same program, it might be that both make the same systematic mistake.

Classification by Duration

Faults can be classified by their duration:

(i) **Permanent faults**.
- Remain in existence indefinitely, until corrective action is taken.
- Software faults are always permanent.
- Many hardware component faults are permanent.

(ii) **Transient faults**.
- Appear, and vanish again.
- Typical example are effects of radioactive particles hitting a semi conductor of a memory chip.
  - If it happens, the state of a few bits is changed.
  - But there is no lasting damage to the chip.
- Although infrequent and not lasting, one needs to take steps to correct this error before a system error is caused.

(iii) **Intermittent faults**.
- Appear, disappear, and then reappear after some time.
- Results of
  - poor solder joints, corrosion on connector contacts.
    - At some times connections are possible, at others not.
  - electromagnetic radiation.
  - **Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC)** is the ability of a system to work correctly in the presence of (electromagnetic) interference from other electrical equipment, and not to interfere with other equipment or other parts itself.
Classification by Duration

- Problems of electromagnetic radiation occur
  - within wires of a digital circuits
  - between computers and other sources of noise (usually caused by direct electromagnetic radiation or by coupling through common power lines).
  - Particular problems close to car engines, jet engines, nuclear power reactors, high-power electric motors.
  - Mobile phones and CD/DVD players cause nowadays problems (e.g. not allowed in planes).
- **Software errors**, especially those caused by race conditions, often appear to be intermittent, but are always permanent.

Classification by Extent

Faults can be classified by their extent:

- **(i) Localised faults** affect only a single hardware or software module.
- **(ii) Global faults** have effects that permeate through the entire system.

(c) Fault Models

- In order to analyse the effect of **hardware faults** on the entire system, one uses **fault models**.
- These are **not perfect representations** of what is physically actually happening.
- However, they help to design **test procedures**, to simulate **fault conditions**, and to develop **fault tolerant** systems.
  - Testing of safety critical software needs to take into account that safety requirements are met even if one or two hardware components fail.
We consider 3 fault models:

- **Single-stuck-at fault model**
- **Bridging fault model**
- **Stuck-open fault model**

**Single-stuck-at model** assumes that a fault within a module causes it to respond as if one of its inputs or outputs is stuck at logic 0 or 1, and such that the basic functionality of the circuit is otherwise unaffected.

**Example: Or-Gate**

Assume for instance an or gate with inputs input1, input2 and output output:

- If input1 is stuck at 0 then the output is computed as follows:
  \[
  \text{output} = 0 \vee \text{input2} = \text{input2}
  \]
Example: Or-Gate

- If input1 is stuck at 1, then the output is constant 1:
  \[
  \text{output} = 1 \lor \text{input2} = 1
  \]
- This is identical to the situation where the output is stuck at 1.

Analysis of Single-Stuck-At Model

- Majority of faults arising from broken tracks, open or short-circuit components and shorts between tracks can be represented by the single-stuck-at model.
- Single-stuck-at model cannot represent accurately transient or intermittent faults.

  **Complexity of testing:**
  - For a circuit with N nodes there are only 2N single-stuck-at faults:
    - one for each node stuck at 0,
    - one for each node stuck at 1.
  - Exhaustive testing feasible.

Bridging Model

- A **bridging** or **short-circuit fault** occurs when two or more nodes in a circuit are accidentally joined together to form a permanent fault.
- In positive logic, i.e.
  - 1 represented by power on,
  - 0 represented by power off,
  a bridging fault between two inputs has the effect of both inputs being ANDed together (see next slide).
- In negative logic, i.e.
  - 1 represented by power off,
  - 0 represented by power on,
  a bridging fault between two inputs has the effect of both inputs being ORed together (see next slide).

Simple Example (Bridging Fault)
Bridges between inputs and outputs might result in converting combinatorial circuits into sequential ones, and might result in instability or oscillation.

Bridging faults behave usually different from single-stuck-at faults. **Complexity of testing** more complex:

- For a circuit with $N$ nodes there are $\binom{N}{M}$ bridging faults between $M$ notes at the same time.
- Especially, there are $\binom{N}{2} = \frac{N(N-1)}{2}$ bridging faults between two nodes.
- Makes exhaustive testing impossible in most cases.
The Stuck-Open Model

- **Stuck-open** fault occurs if in a CMOS gate, both output transistors are turned off because of an internal open- or short-circuit.
- Therefore output is neither pulled to high nor to low.
- Depending on the exact fault, the gate will alternate between driving the output or maintaining its previous output.
- Length of time it maintains its output depends on the gate and the nature of the fault.
- Therefore circuit gets a complex sequential characteristic.

Use of Fault Models

- Exhaustive testing of circuits is not feasible except for simple combinatorial circuits.
- Using fault models, test vectors can be developed which test for faults occurring by one of the above fault models.
  - Testing only feasible by assuming single failures.
  - E.g. a circuit with N nodes can have $3^N - 1$ multiple stuck-at faults, which is infeasible to test.
  - Why $3^N - 1$ faults?
    - Each of the nodes can be error free, stuck at 1 and stuck at 0, giving $3^N$ possibilities.
    - The only case when the circuit is correct is when all nodes are error free. Excluding it we get $3^N - 1$ faulty cases.

- Testing for bridging faults usually infeasible as well. Usually restriction to testing for single occurrences of single-stuck-at faults.
- Fault models can be used for developing strategies for tolerating faults.
- **Limitations:**
  - Hardware design faults (especially wrong logic design) are usually not covered by those fault models.
  - Software faults are usually not covered by these models.
    - In software reliability engineering, fault models for software are developed.
(d) Fault Coverage

- **Fault coverage** is the fraction of possible faults that can be avoided, removed, detected or tolerated.
  - Usually it is difficult to give a numerical estimate, except when good fault models can be used.
- **Fault removal coverage** is the fraction of faults found during the testing phase of system development.
  - Testing vectors aim at 100% fault removal coverage for the faults in the underlying fault model.
  - However, fault models never include all possible faults.
  - Especially, most models cover only single faults and don’t cover transient or intermittent faults.
  - Therefore, fault removal coverage is never 100%.

- **Fault detection coverage** is the ability of a system to detect faults during operation.
  - Using fault models, fault detection coverage can be estimated, but we have the same limitations as above.
- **Fault tolerance coverage** is the ability of a system to tolerate faults.

(e) Redundancy

For this subsection no additional material has been added yet.
6 (f) Fault Detection Techniques

6 (a) Introduction
6 (b) Types of Faults
6 (c) Fault Models
6 (d) Fault Coverage
6 (e) Redundancy

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6 (g) Hardware Fault Tolerance
6 (h) Software Fault Tolerance
6 (i) Fault Tolerant Architectures
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6 (c) Fault Models
6 (d) Fault Coverage
6 (e) Redundancy
6 (f) Fault Detection Techniques
6 (g) Hardware Fault Tolerance
6 (h) Software Fault Tolerance
6 (i) Fault Tolerant Architectures
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