

Towards formal testing of jet engine Rolls-Royce BR725*

Greg Holland¹, Temesghen Kahsai²,
Markus Roggenbach², Bernd-Holger Schlingloff³

¹ Rolls-Royce Plc. Derby, UK.

² Department of Computer Science, Swansea University, UK.

³ Humboldt University Berlin, Fraunhofer FIRST, Germany.

Abstract. The Rolls-Royce BR725 is a newly designed jet engine for ultra-long-range and high-speed business jets. In this paper we apply our theory of formal testing [5,6] to the starting system of the Rolls-Royce BR725 control software. To this end we model the system in CSP, evaluate test suites against the formal model, and finally execute test suites in an in-the-loop setting of the SUT. This case study demonstrates the applicability of our testing approach to industrial systems: it scales up to real world applications and it potentially fits into current verification and quality assurance processes, as e.g., in place at Rolls-Royce.

1 Introduction

Jet engines belong to the safety critical systems of an air plane. Their control software can be classified as a reactive system: it accepts commands from the pilot, receives status messages from the airframe and the engine sensors, and issues commands to the engine. Here, we report on the successful application of our theory of specification based testing [5,6] to such systems.

Our testing theory has been developed for the formal specification language CSP-CASL [10]. CSP-CASL allows to formalize systems in a combined algebraic / process algebraic notation. To this end it integrates the process algebra CSP [3,11] and the algebraic specification language CASL [8]. In the context of this paper we restrict CSP-CASL to (a sub-language of) CSP_M, the machine-readable version of CSP.

Figure 1 shows our testing approach in a nutshell. *Specification*, *Implementation* and *Test Cases* are mutually related artifacts. *Specifications* and *Test Cases* are written in CSP-CASL, the *Implementation* is treated as a black box. *Test cases* can be constructed either from the specification – as shown in the triangle – or independently from it. The specification determines the alphabet of the test suite, and the expected result of each test case. The expected result is coded in a colouring scheme of test cases. If a test case is constructed which checks for the presence of a required feature (according to the specification), we define its colour to be *green*. If a test case checks for the absence of some unwanted behaviour, we say that it has the colour *red*. If the specification does neither require nor disallow the behaviour tested by the test case, i.e., if a System Under Test (SUT) may or may not implement this behaviour, the colour of the test case is

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


Fig. 1. Validation triangle

defined to be *yellow*. During the execution of a test on a particular SUT, the *verdict* is determined by comparing the colour of the test case with the actual behaviour. A test *fails*, if the colour of the test case is green but the SUT does not exhibit this behaviour, or if the colour is red but the behaviour can be observed in the SUT. The execution of a yellow test case yields an inconclusive verdict. Otherwise, the test passes.

Here, we apply our theory to the starting system of Rolls-Royce BR725⁴ software control. The BR725 is a newly designed jet engine for ultra-long-range and high-speed business jets. It is part of the BR700 family. We model the starting system in CSP and validate our model using the CSP simulator PROBE. We then evaluate the test suites against the formal model. Such evaluation is done using the model checker FDR2. Part of the test suites is inspired by existing test cases of the BR700 family jet engines. We execute our test suite in an in-the-loop setting on the so-called “rig”. This puts the engine control system through test scenarios identical to those carried out in engine test stand testing, however with considerable lower cost, reduced risk, and less burden on human and mechanical resources.

Outline In Section 2 we give an overview of the test evaluation theory from [5] and a brief introduction to CSP_M and FDR2. In Section 3 we describe a control system of a jet engine in general and the starting system of the Rolls-Royce BR725 jet engine in particular. We also show how we model the latter in CSP_M. Subsequently, in Section 4 we show how we evaluate and execute test cases.

2 Testing in CSP-CASL

In this section we give an overview of the theory of specification-based testing presented in [5,6]. The theory is based on the specification language CSP-CASL [10] which allows to formalize computational system in a combined algebraic / process algebraic notation. CSP-CASL uses the process algebra CSP [3,11] for the modeling of reactive behaviour, whereas the communicated data is specified in CASL [8]. CSP-CASL has been deployed in the modeling [2] and verification [4] of an electronic payment system.

In [5], a theory for the evaluation of test cases with respect to CSP-CASL specifications has been developed. In summary, the main benefits of this theory are as follows.

⁴ In the rest of the paper we will refer to this engine type simply as BR725.

- Separation of test case construction from specification and implementation: A test case only refers to the signature of a specification. This allows to start the development of test suites as soon as an initial, abstract version of the specification is available, in parallel to the development of the actual implementation.
- Separation of the test oracle and the test evaluation problem: Test cases are constructed with respect to an (abstract) specification and executed on a (concrete) implementation. The specification determines the expected result of a test case, and the implementation the verdict. Therefore, the intrinsically hard test oracle problem can be solved before the actual execution, whereas test evaluation can be done online.
- Positive and negative test cases: The intention of a test case with respect to a specification is coded by a colouring scheme. It is possible to construct test cases for the intended behaviour (colour *green*) as well as for unwanted behaviour (colour *red*) of an implementation.
- Three-valued evaluation scheme for test cases: The colour of a test case as determined by a specification is either *green*, *red* or *yellow*; the test verdict is either *pass*, *fail* or *inconclusive*. The test verdict is obtained by comparing intended and actual behaviour of an SUT. Yellow test cases lead to inconclusive test verdicts, indicating that the specification is not complete in this point.

A specification with monomorphic data and no internal non-determinism in the process has resolved all design decisions. We show in [5] that such specifications have no yellow test cases.

A test case is executed on a particular SUT. In [5] we define a *point of control and observation (PCO)* in order to map the events of the SUT to the event names (concrete: CASL-terms) of the test case. A PCO $\mathcal{P} = (\mathcal{A}, \|\dots\|, \mathcal{D})$ of an SUT consists of the alphabet \mathcal{A} of events of the SUT, a mapping $\|\dots\| : \mathcal{A} \rightarrow T_{\Sigma}(X)$ which returns a term for each $a \in \mathcal{A}$, and a direction $D : \mathcal{A} \rightarrow \{ts2sut, sut2ts\}$. *ts2sut* stands for signals which are sent from the testing system to the SUT, and *sut2ts* stands for signals which are sent in the other direction.

We also define the *execution* of a test case on an SUT at a PCO. The test verdict is obtained algorithmically by comparing the actual behaviour of the SUT with the trace of the test case. The noncompliance to a green test case or compliance to a red one leads to test failure. The compliance to a green test case or noncompliance to a red one leads to passing the test.

2.1 CSP_M and FDR2

CSP_M [11,12] is the machine readable version of CSP, which also includes a simple functional programming language. Data in CSP_M is monomorphic.

We choose CSP_M instead of CSP-CASL thanks to the nature of the system specifications we formalize. These specifications do not require loosely specified data or complex data structures. Instead, they use simple data types only; mostly they speak about booleans and finite subranges of numbers. These data types are available in the type system of CSP_M, and they can also be modelled within CASL. This justifies the use of CSP_M instead of CSP-CASL.

Employing CSP_M allows us to use the model checker FDR2 [7,11] to prove the test colouring in an automatic way. When using full CSP-CASL, the proof of colouring has to be done using the CSP-CASL-PROVER [9], which as an interactive theorem prover requires costly human interaction. FDR2 is a model checking tool developed by Formal Systems (Europe). The input language of FDR2 is CSP_M. FDR2 offers, e.g., to check for trace refinement, or to check if a process is deterministic. The following table collects the syntax of some CSP process constructs that we will be using in order to model the BR725 Starting System; for a complete description of CSP_M see [11].

CSP_M- Process definition	
$P \ / \ Q$	-- Interrupt
$P \ > \ Q$	-- Untimed timed out
$P \ [b \ \ a] \ Q$	-- Alphabetized parallel
$P \ \ Q$	-- Interleaving
$P \ [] \ Q$	-- External choice
$P \ [[a \leftarrow b]]$	-- Renaming
$P \ \backslash \ a$	-- Hiding

3 Modelling the BR725 starting system in CSP

In this section we give a brief description of the control system of the jet engine in general, and the starting system functionality in particular. We also report how the modeling of the starting system in CSP has been carried out. We work on the same level of abstraction as the Rolls-Royce system verification team which tests the engine control system on system level.

The main component of the control system of a jet engine is the *Electronic Engine Controller* (EEC). A simplified view of the BR725 EEC architecture and its interfaces with the engine is shown in Figure 3. The EEC encapsulates all signalling aspects of the engine; it controls, protects, and monitors the engine. In order to provide fault-tolerance, the EEC is realised as a dual-channel system. Its control loop involves: reading data from sensors and other computer systems in the aircraft, receiving commands from the pilot, calculating new positions of the engine actuators, and issuing commands to the engine actuators. In its monitoring function it transmits data about the engine condition and information on any failures diagnosed on the electronics back to the aircraft. Here we focus on the *Starting System*, one of the many functionalities the EEC provides.

3.1 Starting System of BR725

The jet engine BR725 can be started in both, on-ground and in-flight situations. Furthermore, the pilot can select between *Automatic* or *Manual* starting mode. Moreover, the Starting System may be used to provide engine *Cranking*.

The detected situation (on-ground or in-flight) together with the selected starting mode (automatic or manual) results in four different control flows in which the EEC controls the engine. Cranking adds two further flows of the EEC, namely *dry* and *wet* cranking (i.e., without and with fuel on respectively). In the following we discuss the manual on-ground starting sequence. Starting the jet engine essentially involves three steps:




Fig. 2. Electronic Engine Controller Architecture – Courtesy of Rolls-Royce

1. A motor – the so-called Starter – which is mechanically coupled to a shaft of the engine, starts to rotate the engine.
2. When the shaft has reached a sufficient rotational speed, fuel is allowed to flow to the combustion chamber and the engine lights up.
3. When the rotational speed of the engine reaches a threshold the engine start is complete.

Figure 3 shows an abstraction of the basic system architecture of a Rolls-Royce jet engine starting system. The main signals transmitted between the components are as follows. In the Cockpit the pilot has a start switch in order to initiate the starting sequence; the pilot also has a fuel switch. The Airframe informs the EEC if the plane is in-flight or on-ground. The EEC can switch the Starter On and Off, can Open and Close the fuel SOV (*Shut-Off Valve*), and can turn the Ignition On and Off. The engine reports back to the EEC information about the shaft speed and the TGT (*Turbine Gas Temperature*). For BR725 the Rolls-Royce *Starting Subsystem Definition Document* (SSDD) makes the Starting System within the EEC specific to this engine. This document describes all aspects of the Starting System: it gives an overview of the Starting System in general, it presents so-called activity diagrams and explains them in plain English. In the following we give an example of such an activity diagram and its accompanying text.

Figure 4 shows the internal logic of the manual ground start in the form of an activity diagram. These activity diagrams are formulated in an informal, graphical specification language. This language was specifically developed by Rolls-Royce in order to describe engine controllers. An example of an accompanying text would be the following:

I3005/1 *When NH reaches the required speed, the pilot switches the Fuel Control Switch to RUN.*

Note that every specification line is identified with a unique number, in our example with I3005/1. Rolls-Royce makes use of this during the testing process as a coverage criterion: it is required that there is at least one test case for every line in the specification. Figure 4 shows the Manual Ground Start (MGS) functionality which allows the pilot to start the engine manually. The flow from the start point to the second transition shows that the MGS can only be initiated when the aircraft is on the ground and the en-




Fig. 3. Starting system component architecture

engine is not running, starting or cranking. In this situation the pilot can initiate the MGS by selecting the following control switches: *Master Crank* to *On*, *Continuous Ignitions* to *On*, and *Engine Start* to *On*.

Upon switching the *Engine Start* to *On*, the EEC will command the *Starter Air Valve (SAV)* to be opened and the starter motor is activated. If the pilot now switches the *Fuel Control Switch* to *Run* the EEC commands the fuel to flow. If at this point the *Continuous Ignitions* is still *On* the EEC ignites the motor (not shown in the Figure) and begins to monitor the shaft speed of the engine. Should this speed reach a certain threshold the starting procedure is complete. While the starting procedure is active within the EEC, the pilot can abort it by switching the *Master Crank* or the *Fuel Control* to *Off*. If the pilot switches the *Continuous Ignitions* to *Off* the starting procedure ends in an error state.

3.2 Modelling of the starting system in CSP

Our main objective is to capture in a faithful way the original specification of the Starting System. To this end, we model the system in a way that a natural mapping can be drawn between the original specification (SSDD activity diagrams) and the CSP model. In the following we describe some aspects of the modeling in CSP of the manual on-ground starting procedure.

We have modeled the system in a two step approach: first we formalize the 'normal' execution pattern of the system. Only in a second step we add the handling of error cases such as interrupting the start by switching *Continuous Ignitions* to *Off*. CSP supports such a compositional approach of modelling via its interrupt operator.




Fig. 4. Activity diagram for manual ground start - Courtesy of Rolls-Royce

In the following we describe some of the patterns which we have identified in the modeling process. We first describe some patterns and discuss then how their combination results in the overall control-flow.

Switch Buttons have two states: ON and OFF. Pressing a button in state OFF will turn it ON, releasing a button in state ON will turn it OFF.

```

channel press, release
ButtonOFF = press -> ButtonON
ButtonON = release -> ButtonOFF
  
```

We instantiate `ButtonON` and `ButtonOFF` to form the different switch buttons available in the Cockpit for the Starting System. This is done by simply using the CSP renaming operator, e.g., for `MasterCrank`:

```
channel mc_press, mc_release
MasterCrank = ButtonOFF[press <- mc_press
                release <- mc_release]
```

All button processes run in an interleaved way. This corresponds to arbitrary press / release operations in the Cockpit. Note how this specification⁵ covers in an obvious way part of the activity diagram in Figure 4.

```
Buttons = MasterCrank
          ||| MasterStart
          ||| EngineStartON
```

Active waiting The starting sequence can only proceed when the following events happens: (1) the checks for *Aircraft* and *Engine* condition has been successful, (2) the pilot has issued the necessary starting commands. This is captured in the CSP model in the following way:

```
InteractEEC= (CheckConditions
              [|{synchStart}||
              CrankAndIgnite)
              \ {synchStart}
              ; FuelAndSAV
              ; MasterIdle
```

where `CheckConditions` is the process that checks for the *Aircraft* and *Engine* condition. `CrankAndIgnite` is the process that handles the input of the pilot; namely the cranking and the ignition commands. `CheckConditions` and `CrankAndIgnite` synchronize on the `synchStart` event, only when the synchronization is successful the process `FuelAndSAV` takes over. The `FuelAndSAV` and `MasterIdle` processes capture the rest of the starting sequence.

Interleaving of decisions At different points of the activity diagram there are decisions that happen in an interleaved way. We model this scenario using the external choice operator⁶ in the following way:

```
CrankAndIgnite = mc_press -> ci_press -> InitStartOK
                 [] ci_press -> mc_press -> InitStartOK
```

Here, the process `CrankAndIgnite` offers the to first switch `MasterCrank` or `ContIgnition`.

The whole manual on-ground start sequence is represented by the process `MGS`. The processes `InteractEEC` and `Buttons` runs in an alphabetized parallel. This corresponds to the interaction of the pilot (through the Cockpit switches) and the EEC.

⁵ We leave out the code of the `EngineStartON` which as a push button has no state.

⁶ In order to have state names available, we choose the semantically equivalent encoding of interleaving in terms of external choice and action prefix.

```
MGS_Core = InteractEEC || Buttons
```

In the second step of the modeling process we have identified and handled the error cases. Observing the activity diagrams, at different points of time during the starting sequence the pilot has the ability to abort the sequence by releasing the `FuelControl` or the `ContIgnition`. We model this procedure using the CSP interrupt operator - $P \wedge Q$ – the progress of the process P can be interrupted on occurrence of the first event of Q .

```
channel commandIgnOFF, abort, error
InterruptFC = fc_release -> abort -> SKIP
InterruptCI = ci_release -> commandIgnOFF -> Error
(InteractEEC /\

MGS_ErrorHandling = MGS_Core /\ InterruptFC
```

The abortion due to releasing of the `MasterCrank` is only available after the *Command Fuel ON* event has occurred and prior reaching the *Starter Disengagement Speed*. In a pictorial way in Figure 4, this is identified by the dotted box.

Simulations with the CSP animator PROBE, discussions with the Rolls-Royce verification team, and – last but not least – the structural correspondence with the activity diagram validate our formal model. Checking our model in FDR2 shows that it has the expected properties: it is deterministic, it is deadlock-free and it is livelock-free.

3.3 Questions on the activity diagram

Rolls-Royce uses activity diagrams as shown in Figure 4 merely as memos. The engineers share a common understanding of jet engines, the activity diagrams serve more to trigger knowledge how the control software works. Here, we list some of the shortcomings that we encountered during the modeling and reading process of the SSDD specification document.

- Although the *Engine Start* is a momentary button and *Master Crank* is a push button with two states both are shown with the same symbol in the activity diagram. That the *Engine Start* is a momentary button becomes clear from the textual description of the activity diagram. This explains also why there is no interrupt related to this button.
- We identically modeled both boxes which monitor speed (*Monitor Starter Disengagement Speed*, *Monitor Achieving of Idle*) relatively to the signal *NH*, while in the activity diagram the first box has no self-loop and the second box has a self-loop.
- Although the commands *Command IGN ON* and *Command IGN OFF* appear at first sight to be related, they are not: the command *Command IGN ON* is given by the pilot in the cockpit while the command *Command IGN OFF* is sent by the EEC to the engine. Therefore, we model these commands via two different channels.
- As there is a command *Command FUEL ON* one would expect command *Command FUEL OFF* to appear in the activity diagram, e.g., when aborting the start. However, this is not the case.

3.4 Modeling in CSP

Here we outline the pros and cons of modeling the system in CSP. On the positive side, various CSP operator came very handy in the modeling process. The interleaving operator, the sequential composition, the hiding operator and the interrupt allowed us to capture many system aspects in an elegant way. On the negative side, the global state approach of CSP forced us to explicitly have one process name per transition (arrow in the activity diagrams). This allowed us to take care of or ignore state changes of the buttons while following the control flow of the activity diagram. Overall, however, CSP served well in modeling such a controller.

4 Testing the BR725 starting system

In this section we describe the evaluation of test cases, how we establish the PCO and execute the test cases on the rig. Some test cases for the BR725 manual ground start have been inspired from previous projects concerning the BR700.

4.1 Test case evaluation

In [5] we present a syntactic characterization of the semantical notion of colouring a test case $T = t_1 \rightarrow t_2 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow t_n \rightarrow STOP$, $n \geq 0$. To this end we define a process $Check_T$:

$$Check_T = ((P \parallel T)[[R_1]] \dots [[R_n]] |[obs]| count(n)) \setminus \{obs\}$$

$$count(n : Nat) = \text{if } n = 0 \text{ then } OK \rightarrow SKIP \text{ else } count(n - 1)$$

The synchronous parallel operator \parallel forces P and T to agree on all communications. Should P agree to execute the communications t_1, \dots, t_n of T in exactly this order, this results in a sequence of n communications. All these communications are renamed into obs via the predicates R_i . The process $count$ communicates OK after the execution of n obs 's. Hiding the communication obs makes only this OK visible. A test process is red, iff $Check_T \neq_{\mathcal{T}} OK \rightarrow SKIP$. For a test process to be green, it is necessary that $Check_T =_{\mathcal{T}} OK \rightarrow SKIP$. As our model is deterministic, this necessary condition becomes a sufficient one.

As a first test cases we encode a supposedly successful on-ground manual start. The following is the input test script for FDR2:

```
channel OK, obs
GREEN = OK -> SKIP
TC1 = aircraftCondition.true -> engineCondition.true -> mcpress -> ci_press
-> engineStartON -> sav.open -> fc_press -> commandFuelON -> commandIgnON
-> readNH.17 -> sav.close -> readNH.68 -> started -> STOP

CheckT = ( ( ( MGS [ {|aircraftCondition.true,...,started|} ] TC1 % Parallel
            ) [|aircraftCondition.true <- obs,...,started <-obs|] % Renaming
            ) [| {obs} |] obs -> ... -> obs -> OK -> STOP % Parallel
            ) \ { obs } % Hiding

assert CheckT [T= GREEN          assert GREEN [T= CheckT          % Verify the colour
```

In `CheckT` we encode the traces condition. Equality checking in FDR2 is done by checking for mutual refinement, i.e., $\sqsubseteq_{\mathcal{T}} \wedge \sqsupseteq_{\mathcal{T}} \Rightarrow =_{\mathcal{T}}$. FDR2 instantly proves that both assertions hold.

For red test cases it is sufficient to show that the condition on the traces doesn't hold. To this end we check if one of the assertions for the traces condition concerning `CheckT` fails. T2 encodes a manual on-ground start sequence, in which the first NH value is less than the prescribed threshold (15). Therefore, T2 is colored red.

```
T2 = aircraftCondition.true -> engineCondition.true -> mc_press -> ci_press
-> engineStartON -> sav.open -> fc_press -> commandFuelON -> commandIgnON
-> readNH.10 -> sav.close -> readNH.68 -> started -> STOP

assert not GREEN [T= CheckT                                assert not CheckT [T= GREEN
```

FDR2 instantly proves the test case to be red.

As the datatypes in `CSP_M` are all monomorphic, and as our model of the starting system is deterministic, there are no yellow test cases (see Section 2).

4.2 Establishing a PCO

The test verdict is obtained during the execution of a test case in the hardware-in-the-loop rig. Rolls-Royce uses a proprietary scripting language in order to write test scripts; a snippet of such script is shown below:

```
1 | Set ("MasterCrankCnd", 1)           7 | Set ("REngStartCnd", 0)
2 | WaitTime (2)                       8 | WaitUntil ("NHP>15")
3 | Set ("REngContinuousIGN", 1)      9 | Set ("MasterLever", 0)
4 | WaitTime (2)                      10 | WaitUntil ("LIT=1")
5 | Set ("REngStartCnd", 1)           11 | Set ("FlightStatus", 1)
6 | WaitTime (2)                      12 | WaitUntil ("NHP>65", 60)
                                   13 | ...
```

For instance, line 1,3,5 are commands to switch the *Master Crank*, *Continuous Ignition* and *Fuel Control* switch to ON respectively. The time delay inbetween commands is necessary in order to capture the signal, and store it in a log for an offline analysis.

We link this scripting language and our formulation of tests by defining a PCO $\mathcal{P} = (\mathcal{A}, \|\dots\|, \mathcal{D})$:

- The alphabet of the SUT is $\mathcal{A} = \{ \text{MasterCrankCnd}, \dots, \text{FlightStatus} \}$.
- We use ASN.1 (Abstract Syntax Notation One) [1] to map primitive events to `CSP_M` events.

```
MasterCrankCnd ::= ENUMERATED {      MasterLever ::= ENUMERATED {
    mc_press      (1)                fc_press      (1)
    mc_release    (0) }              fc_release    (0) }
```

For example, we describe `MasterCrankCnd` and `MasterLever` as the **ASN.1** type *ENUMERATED*; `MasterCrankCnd` can take only the values specified in the list, e.g. the value 0 stands for `mc_press`.

- The direction of primitive events are defined as follows: *ts2RIG* stands for signals which are sent from the testing software to the rig. For instance, all commands `set(...)` in the test script above are of type *ts2RIG*. The other direction *RIG2ts*, which stands for signals which are sent from the rig to the testing software. Those are captured by different logging systems; for instance, the command `Log_HST(...)` logs primary variables of the EEC, `Log_Mod(...)` logs simulation parameters and `Log_HST(...)` logs aircraft discretets. The following are examples of such logging system:

```
Log_HST("mstrstrtswtchsnckpt") ;Master Start Switch - EEC variable
Log_Mod("P30") ;Engine pressure simulation parameters
```

After running the test case on the rig, the test verdict is obtained “offline” by analyzing the different logs.

5 Conclusions




Fig. 5. Overall modelling and testing process

In this paper we have applied the theory of formal testing based on CSP-CASL, to the starting system of Rolls-Royce BR725 control software. We have modeled the system in CSP, evaluate test suites against the formal model using the model checker FDR2. We executed the test suites in an in-the-loop setting of the SUT. The SUT did not show any deviation from the intended behaviour, i.e., the testing process increased the trust in its correctness. The overall approach described in this paper is reported in Figure 5. This case study demonstrates the applicability of our testing approach to industrial systems: it scales up to real world applications and it potentially fits into current verification practice at Rolls-Royce. Future work will address the questions of (automatic) test case generation and of suitable test coverage criteria. Furthermore, we will improve our theory of testing for enhancement in order to formally accommodate modeling in which error handling is added later on.

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